2011年9月18日日曜日

Export control violation of pump for chemical

According to several major news papers on Sept 13, a Japanese machine manufacturer exported pump for chemical plant illegally to China, without obtaining export license by METI.
The company name is Shin Toyo Kikai Kogyo Co., Ltd, medium size pump manufacturer, located in Saitama in Kanto region.  They allegedly exported pump for chemical use to a company in China.  The end-user is Japanese company's subsidiary, which is auto manufacturing and one of subsidiaries  of JFE Steel, steel manufacturing giant in Japan.

Not sure what category the chemical pump is classified.  My guess is Japanese Category 3 (2) (or US ECCN 2B350).  Because the end-use is auto-manufacturing site of Japanese subsidiary, it is not likely this case is violation of WMD catch-all control.  (The detail of the product is not disclosed, this is my guess.)

The president of Shin Toyo Kikai Kogyo admit they prioritized lead time and quick delivery, rather than applying export license to METI which they considered time loss.  The lead time of export licens by METI is typically about 1 week, but METI tend to require several supporting documents or end-use statement etc., case by case, the preparation of export license require significant time, energy and cost, especially to an exporter who is not familiar with export control system.

However, they will pay much more time loss (and also credibility loss & money loss!) by this violation.

2011年9月7日水曜日

METI add more FAQ in post-license manegement

Japanese METI updated the export control license management FAQ on Sept 5, 2011.
Unfortunately for most of global traders, this FAQ is written only in Japanese and no English translation.
What is written in this FAQ is about the procedure of supporting documents and post-license management in exporting Japanese control item Category 4 (18) - Batch mixers and Continuous mixers - or equivalent to US ECCN 1B117 and 1B118.

In exporting such goods, the export license is required with various supporting documents.  The supporting documents include (in case by case) the statement of end-user, factory layout plan where the equipments are installed, the oath of NOT relocating the equipment to another location even in another floor in the same property, etc. etc. 
What is written here is guideline of such supporting documents and METI's policy of post-license management.  As long as the license applicant follow up to clear the diversion risk and non proliferation concern and report to METI in advance if required so, METI don't prohibit relocation of the equipments.

When I talk with non-Japanese export control specialist, some of them complaint about Japanese METI's extra-territorial control.  In principle, Japanese export control law is NOT extra-territorial, but some believe the METI's post-license management is substantially extra-territorial effect.  That may be partly true from operator's point of view.  Why foreign end-users need to have approval of METI when they relocate the controlled equipments which were exported legally under METI license?  In order to mitigate such Japan extra-territorial license management practice, METI try to refine the FAQ by providing much guidance with details.  Hope this FAQ is provided in English.

(Resource from below URL - in Japanese.)

Q&A「6.連続式の混合機関連 別表第1の4の項(8)」 ttp://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/qanda065.html

Q&A「7.連続式の混合機関連 別表第1の4の項(8)<添付資料関係>」http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/qanda0655.html

2011年9月1日木曜日

Update of proliferation concern list in Japan

On September 1st, 2011, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry ("METI") announced its update of Proliferation concerned parties list (otherwise called Foreign Users List or Gaikoku User List) on its web site.
This list is similar to Entity List of US BIS.  The listed entities are considered as have been involved in development, manufacturing, use or storage of weapon of massive destruction ("WMD").  Please be noted this list is not embargo list.  Although trader needs to have close attention to WMD proliferation concern when doing trade with listed entities, if it is obviously clear the item is not used for WMD purpose, the trade is not denied.  This list have been updated in practice once a year, last update was September 2010.

The new list can be found here:  http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/tutatu/t08kaisei/110901EUL/t08kaisei_userlist_kohyo.pdf

In total, the number of entities are increased to 354.  I didn't closely check the entity name, but most of the increased entities are in Iran and in North Korea.  Indian entities are decreased much.

For global traders, what entity is decontolled, especially in India & China, would be point of interest.  The entity names which are removed from the list are as follows.

・【India】Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), DRDO

・【India】Bharat Dynamics Ltd. (BDL)

・【India】Indian Rare Earths Ltd. (IRE), DAE

・【India】Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre (LPSC), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)

・【India】Satish Dhawan Space Centre (SDSC), ISRO

・【India】Solid State Physics Laboratory, DRDO
 
・【India】United Phosphorous Limited

・【China】China Electronic Product Reliability Environmental Testing Research Institute (CEPREI)

Above entity names are no longer in the list as WMD proliferation concerned parties of Japanese METI.
However, for traders who handles US origin items, it is important to note Indian Rare Earths Ltd. (IRE), Department of Atomic Energy, is still listed on Entity List of US EAR.  It is encouraged to double check with other restricted parties list issued by US government.